Feudalizmus

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Definicio

A Feudalizmus fogalmának leírását lásd itt:

Hosszabb elemzését lásd itt:

Magyar vonatkozásait lásd itt.

(Ókori) Római vonatkozásait lásd itt.

A fogalomhoz vagy a korszakhoz kapcsolódó további definíciókat lásd itt:

Alapkerdes

Alapkérdésünk, hogy a feudalizmus

  • jellemző-e a jelenlegi korunkra és helyünkre, és
  • ha igen, milyen értelemben jellemző.

A kutatás közben az alábbi kérdés lebeg szemünk előtt: mit használhatunk jelenleg a feudalizmus tapasztalataiból?

Státusz

Kutatas elozmenyei

Eddig nyilvánosan elsősorban az a témakör érdekelt, amely itt Jelenlegi releváns feltételek címen szerepel:

Feudalizmus vagy középkor témakörben egyelőre egyáltalán nem vagyok járatos, és jó darabig nem is érdekelt. Ami a témakörben felkeltette a figyelmemet, az három dolog volt:

  • Amit szeretek a történelem témakörben, az az ókori Róma, mint működő rendszer. Ehhez kapcsolódóan és ehhez képest a középkor (mint a régi rendszer felbomlása és/vagy az átalakulása valami újjá) valamennyire mindigis érdekelt.
  • A fenti cikkekkel kapcsolatban nehezen lehetett volna kikerülni a neomedievalizmus témakörét, természetes középkori vonatkozásokkal.
  • Más kutatásaim során beleütköztem a témába. Ezek nem közvetlen kapcsolatok a középkori történelemmel, pl. így néznek ki:

Itt és hasonló alkalmakkor egy hosszú lánc végén szerepelek, ami igencsak távol áll attól, hogy bármilyen értelemben történelmi kutatásnak nevezzük.

Vitányi Iván felkérését mégis köszönettel elfogadtam.

  • A személyfogalommal kapcsolatos kutatásaim során többször beleütköztem a középkori személy-koncepcióba: fontosnak tartom, hogy tüzetesen utána járjak a releváns vonatkozásoknak.
  • Előzetes információim alapján érdekelt az univerzális rendbe illeszkedő anarchia, mégpedig a mai áthallásai miatt. E témakörben a magyar vonatkozások a csak annyiban érdekelnek, amennyiben azok általánosítható és általánosan használható tanulságokkal szolgálnak, pl. think global, act local alapon.
  • Miközben Iván felkérése jó ürügy volt már régen esedékes kutatásaim elkezdésére a témában, Iván, mint kutató, egyben olyan személyes tapasztalatokkal is bír, amelyeket mindenképpen érdemes használni: a közös munka során (amely érdemben most kezdődik) a feudalizmus koncepciójának egyes elemeivel kapcsolatban egészen biztosan voltak olyan tapasztalatai és lesznek olyan meglátásai, amelyeket semmilyen más módon nem lehet beszerezni.

Kutatas modszertana es allapota

Mivel a középkor és a feudalizmus szempontjából ilyen hiányos kutatási előzményekkel bírok, a téma felépítését az alapoktól kellett elkezdenem.

Mindenekelőtt szerettem volna összegyűjteni az alapvető bibliográfiát, nem csak a feudalizmus témakörben, hanem kutatás tágabb kontextusában is.

Majd szerettem volna tisztázni a feudalizmus koncepció státuszát a középkorkutatásban általában, és e kutatásban konkrétan is.

E fázisokat első verzióban lezártam.

Ezzel egyidőben explikáltam a kutatás Alapkérdését.

Majd pedig a kifejezés státuszából és a kutatás Alapkérdéséből következően, továbbá a témakörben való járatlanságomat orvosolandó, meghatároztam a kutatás módszertanát.

A módszertan a következő:

(Ez nem egy rövid feladat: jelenleg a Definícióban felsorolt által tucatnyi leírás első néhány tételének feldolgozásán vagyok túl. A hivatkozott, wikin belüli linkek között is csak piros - amely mögött csak a beírás lehetősége van -, és olyan kék linkek vannak, amelyek gyakorlatilag üresek: a kutatás jelenlegi fázisában gyakorlatilag csak ez az egy wikilap van feltöltve, amelyet az Olvasó éppen olvas, és pontosan annyira, amennyit jelenleg lát, hivatkozásként vagy kifejtésként pedig csak a kimenő/külső linkek működnek.)
A módszer előnye, hogy a kutatás minősége folyamatosan javítható: ahogy halad előre az ember az irodalom feldolgozásában,
  • egyrészt egyre teljesebb lesz az elemek felsorolása,
  • másrészt a bejövő új információk feldolgozásának, a látszólagos ellentmondások kiküszöbölésének következtében egyre pontosabb lesz az elemek és kombinációik leírása.
A módszer hátránya, hogy nem ad állandó szerkezetet (tartalomjegyzéket, hivatkozási pontokat): bármikor előfordulhat, hogy egy új információ módosítja vagy pontosítja az eddigi szerkezetet.
amelyeknek egyelőre gyakorlatilag csak a címsorai láthatók.
ahol az Olvasó egyelőre csak a saját magam számára készített emlékeztetőket találja.

2009 december 10-i konzultacio: kerdesek

  • A legfontosabb, a nyitott kérdés, azaz bármi, amit fontosnak találtok a folyamattal kapcsolatban: mi hogyan javítható?
  • Örülnék, ha a feudalizmusról, középkorról, új középkorról, releváns ókorról, magyar vonatkozásokról, egyáltalán: a Bibliográfiában megjelölt témakörökben, közvetlenül (pl. "mi az X?") vagy meta-szinten (pl. "miért nem kell foglalkozni Y-nal?") érdekes irodalmakhoz jutnék. Mit kell feldolgozni feltétlenül ahhoz, hogy a módszertant követve ne alakuljon ki torz kép, különösen az általam egyelőre nem teljesen átlátott témakörökben?
  • Jó az Alapkérdés, javítható, vagy eredendően elhibázott?

2010 január 7-i konzultacio: konferencia elokeszites

Javaslatok az "Uram-bátyám magyar világ" konferenciához.

Bibliografia

Roviditesek

jelenlegi:= jelenlegi és jelenleg várható jövőbeli

rendszer:= gazdasági, társadalmi, politikai és/vagy kormányzati rendszer

A feudalizmus kifejezes formaja

Idoszak-specifikus vagy idoszak-semleges fogalom

Alapkérdésünk a 'feudalizmus' fogalmának használatával kapcsolatban azt a kérdést veti fel, hogy van-e értelme a feudalizmusról a középkoron kívül is beszélni.

Amennyiben Alapkérdérdésünknek értemet szeretnénk tulajdonítani, a feudalizmust nem tekinthetjük csupán középkori kontextusban értelmes fogalomnak. Ezért a továbbiakban a feudalizmust időszak-semleges fogalomként kezeljük.

Rendszer vagy hasonlosag-halo

A 'feudalizmus' kifejezés (rövid történetét lásd itt) használata nem arat osztatlan sikert a történészek között.

Leginkább elvi bajaik vannak a kifejezéssel:

Using the terms seems to lead almost inevitably to treating the ism or its system as a sentient, autonomous agent, to assuming that medieval people - or at least the most perspicacious of them - knew what feudalism was and struggled to achieve it, and to evaluating and ranking societies, areas, and institutions in terms of their approximation to or deviation from an oversimplified Ideal Type. [...] The tyrant feudalism must be declared once and for all deposed and its influence over students of the Middle Ages finally ended. [Brown, 1974: 1088.p.]

Ez a megközelítés időközben a történelemkutatás mainstreamjévé vált (lásd pl. Klaniczay cikkét itt). A mai mainstream kutatás megkérdőjelezi, hogy van-e érteme a feudalizmust egy rendszerként értelmezni.

Mikor beszélünk a feudalizmusról mint rendszerről? Akkor, ha úgy tartjuk, hogy a fogalom használatának megvannak a szükséges és elégséges feltételei; azaz ha olyanok a körülmények, hogy a feudalizmus feltételei "összeállnak", és bekattannak egy rendszerré, rendszert képeznek, ti. a feudális rendszert.

Attól, hogy a feudalizmust rendszerként értelmeznénk, Alapkérdésünknek még lehetne értelme. A feudalizmus ui. Alapkérdésünk szempontjából lehet

  • vagy egy történelmi korszak, azaz egy olyan időszak-specifikus rendszer, amely a történelmi fejlődés egy bizonyos fokán jellemezte az emberiséget
  • vagy egy időszak-semleges rendszer, amelyhez szükséges feltételek bármikor előállhatnak a történelem folyamán.

Ez utóbbi feudalizmus rendszer-értelmezés (és csak az) nincs eleve ellentétben Alapkérdésünkkel.

Ha azonban a Brown fenti cikkének érvelését komolyan vesszük (tegyük ezt), akkor célszerű lehet a feudalizmushoz nem rendszerként, hanem Wittgensteini típusú fogalmi hasonlóság-hálóként közelíteni.

A kifejezes lehetseges formai

Deduktív közelítés Induktív közelítés
Időszak-specifikus 1. Feudalizmus mint történelmi korszak 2. Középkor-kutatás
Időszak-semleges 4. Feudalizmus(?) mint rendszer 3. Új középkor (neomedievalism) vagy Feudalizmus mint fogalmi hasonlóság-háló

A kutatások megközelítése az 1. felől a 2-on [Brown, 1974] keresztül, a 3. dobozban az "új középkor" kitekintés felé haladt, ez utóbbi részeként kitekintéssel a 4. dobozra.

A kifejezes formaja a tovabbiakban

Számunkra tehát a továbbiakban a feudalizmus nem egy rendszer, hanem egy fogalmi hasonlóság-háló, amelyet időszak-semleges módon használunk.

Elképzelhető, hogy ebből a hasonlóság-hálóból kialakul egy olyan feudalizmus-fogalom, amely invariáns

  • az időre
  • a térre
  • a(z emberi) fajra

de a kutatás kezdetén semmi esetre sem vehetjük fel előre a feudalizmus mint rendszer szemlélete által előírt fogalmi "szemüveget", amelyen keresztül értelmeznénk a középkori és a jelenlegi jelenségeket.

Összefoglalva: a továbbiakban a feudalizmus nem történelmi korszak (nem a középkori rendszer), és nem egy bárki által előre gyártott fogalom (nem egy időszak-semleges rendszer), hanem egy fogalmi eszköz arra, hogy a középkorra és a jelenre jellemző körülményeket felfedjük és elemezzük (fogalmi hasonlóság-háló).

E folyamat során

  • nem feltétlenül kell közös rendszert találnunk a körülményekben,
  • és ha rendszert találunk benne sem feltétlenül kell arra jutnunk, hogy ez a rendszer a feudalizmus.

A feudalizmus lehetseges fogalmi elemei

A kozepkori feudalizmus fogalmi elemei

Adoszedes osszeomlasa

Frum,2009 ismertetése szerint Wickham, 2009 a hatalomvesztésben és az adózási kapacitás hiányának következményeként írja le a feudalizmus kialakulását a Nyugat-Római birodalom bukása után (vö. Khan, 2009)

As he tells it, the most important dividing line between “ancient” and “medieval” – the profoundest marker of the “fall of Rome” was not a matter of language or culture, of the shift from togas to tunics or from stuffed swan to roast meat. The most important dividing line was the loss of the power and capacity to tax. [...] After the breakup of the empire, the successor states tried to maintain the old Roman taxes. Some – like the Merovingian Franks – succeeded for a time. But sooner or later, all these tax systems broke down. The world had become too poor, trade and agriculture too unproductive, to yield a positive return on the effort invested in tax collection. Instead, rulers began assigning lands to their supporters – on the understanding that the supporters and their tenants would follow the ruler to war when summoned. Land assignment was much less efficient than taxation, and the opportunity it presented for treachery was obvious, but as the world narrowed, what other choice was there?

Az adóztatási erőfeszítések hiábavalóak voltak és erős passzív ellenállásra vezettek:

[...] early medieval governments had no taxes or rates to speak of at their disposal. The complex and oppressive system of Roman taxation could not be kept up: already in the late years of the Empire its overburdened subjects sought refuge with the barbarians in order to escape from tax collectors. After the downfall of Imperial rule, all the efforts of barbarian kings to maintain systematic taxation were in vain. They called forth insurrections, and even more powerful was a passive resistance in which all persons concerned joined more or less. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

Hatalom fragmentalodasa

A Nyugat-Római Birodalom szétesése után annak területén a hatalom fragmentálódott.

It is [...] an extreme form of decentralization. There many centers of power. Power does not reside at a center, or at the top, even though there a pyramidal structure in theory, with the emperor at the top and the simple knight at the bottom. [Rempel]
Although feudal tenure was certainly the most common mode of holding land, it was not the only one. In France and Germany there were still many survivals of allodial right, that is of complete ownership, not subject to any conditions of service or payment. [...] Many documents shew the constant spread of feudal tenure at the expense of the allodial [...] The dangers of keeping outside the feudal nexus were self-evident: in a time of fierce struggles for bare existence it was necessary for everyone to look about for support, and the protection of the central authority in the State was, even at its best, not sufficient to provide for the needs of individuals. [Vinogradoff, 1924]
A government proceeding on such lines was sure to be soon confronted by an empty exchequer and no legal means to refill it. But though no juridical condition was formulated, the Frankish or Lombard government never lost sight of the beneficia and their holders. The notion that men who had received such beneficia were expected to be especially eager in their service to the kings was not only a precept of morals, but led to practical consequences. Officials who had called forth the displeasure of their masters would very likely see their beneficia confiscated. In England the confiscation of book-land in case of treason or neglect of military duty was recognised by law. Lombard practice shews another curious expedient for asserting the superior right of the Sovereign in regard to estates granted to followers. They were often given in usufruct without charter so that the donee enjoyed only a matter of fact possession without any legal right and could be ousted at pleasure. As a higher degree of favour this precarious tenure of the estate was exchanged for a regular title to it. Thus the earlier period of medieval life may be characterised by the words -- a regime based on pants of usufruct and of ownership in land. This fund was nearly exhausted in France towards the end of the first dynasty, and in consequence the monarchy itself was weakened in every respect and the Merovingian rulers had sunk into the state of rois faineants -- good-for-nothing kings, while real authority rested with the managers of the privy purse and palace stewards -- the majores domus. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

Szemelyes hatalom

Az adószedés összeomlása a közhatalom privatizációjához vezetett.

Taxes broke up into customary payments, and were mixed up in an inextricable manner with rents and profits originating in private ownership. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

A fragmentálódott hatalom magánkezekbe került.

While fiefs were not hereditary in the beginning, they gradually and frequently became hereditary. The holding of a fief was considered to be both an office and private property. As private property a fief could, of course be divided, whereas an office could not be divided. This situation led to the practice of primogeniture. This simply means that the oldest son always inherits the office, although the property that goes with it can be divided among all the heirs, if the holder decides to divide it. This also was fertile ground for discontent and conflict. It contributed to what has been called "feudal chaos" and produced all too frequent warfare. [...] During the period of ripe feudalism the distinction between public rights and private property collapsed. The feudal lord had private rights of possession, such as rents, and public rights, such as the administration of justice. [Rempel]
[...] from the point of view of eighth century law the estate of the tenant was not a form of ownership, of dominium, at all, but a precarious tenancy. As a matter of custom, however, these tenancies soon grew to be recognised as estates of inheritance conditioned by the performance of certain duties to the King as well as by the payment of rents to the Church. The process described exerted a great deal of influence on the formation of a general doctrine as to beneficia in which the conditional character of such donations was emphasised and carried to practical consequences. The Carlovingians worked the administrative apparatus of their empire, as formerly, by means of land-grants, but these grants created definitely conditional tenements. Although as a rule the son succeeded the father as to the "benefice" he was made to ask for a confirmation of his father's estate and might be obliged to pay something for this confirmation. In case of a change in the person of the owner, the superior or senior lord, the practice of resuming the ownership of benefices and of issuing them again under new pants began also to come in. Thus the technical aspect of the practice of feoffment was gradually evolved. [Vinogradoff, 1913]
The medieval view of government admitted, and indeed required, that wealth and social influence should be accompanied by political power and public functions. Every householder had some jurisdiction "under his roof-gutter" (unter der Dachtraufe) and within the hedge. Personal authority over domestic servants and slaves took, among other thing, the shape of criminal and police jurisdiction (Dienstrecht). Again the senior as the centre of a group of vassals claimed the right to preside over a court composed of these vassals, as his "peers," in order to decide civil suits between them. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

Szemelyes hierarchia

A hierarchikus kapcsolatok személyek közötti viszonyokká (Nyugat-Európában: szerződéses viszonyokká) váltak.

Upon the death of the vassal, the oath was formally renewed with the vassals heir. It was a deeply personal and binding contract that few dared to break. [Rempel]

Szemelyes hadviseles

A hadviseléshez szükséges erőt a személyközi kapcsolatok által biztosították.

Szemelyes hadviseles: eredet

A személyközi kapcsolatok által biztosított hadviselés eredete germán, alkalmazása a római időkbe nyúlik vissza.

However great the disorder of these lawless times, certain institutional features stand out as the principal means of government. The comitatus described above on the strength of the narrative of Tacitus, did not disappear but rather grew in importance after the Conquest. To begin with it encountered on Roman soil a relation which had most probably sprung from the same Germanic root, but had acquired new strength under Imperial rule. I mean the so-called bucellarii which appear definitely in the Roman Empire from 395, but are connected with the older practice of employing Germans and other barbarians as guardsmen of the Emperors and of generals. The bucellarius was a soldier who had taken service by private agreement with a military chief. The term is derived from bucella, a roll or biscuit of better quality than the ordinary bread provided for the use of soldiers. Thus the very name of these hired warriors implied a privileged treatment. They received their military outfit from their chiefs and on their death this outfit was returned to the commander. Troops of men enlisted on such lines came to play a great part in the wars of the fifth and sixth centuries. [...] They were gasindi, gesith (Gesinde) of their chiefs, that is, servants. [...]
The relation is generally initiated by two acts: firstly, the submission of the follower to his chief as symbolised by the former stretching out his folded hands which the latter receives in his own; secondly, an oath of fidelity by which the follower promised to support his lord and to be true and faithful to him in every respect The corresponding duties of the lord were to afford protection to his followers and to keep them well. Beowulf poem presents a vivid description of the life of a following, a comitatus, of this kind -- the communion in peace and war, the common feasting in the hall, the moral obligations incurred by the parties to the agreement. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

Szemelyes hadviseles: ved- es dacszovetseg

A külső védelem ilyen módszerrel való biztosítása véd- és dacszövetség jellegű hadviseléshez vezetett:

[...] it was more normal to expect that the quarrels of the lord would automatically involve their vassals. It depended on how weak or strong the vassals were. A strong vassal might refuse to participate in the lord's quarrel and get by with it. All of this led to much private warfare. The feudal system created a formidable military force, well equipped and trained to withstand enemies outside Europe, but it did not necessarily bring peace to the continent. [Rempel]

Szemelyes hadviseles: anarchia

A személyes hadviselés anarchiához vezetett.

A most important consequence of this acknowledgment of sovereign rights on the part of vassals of the Crown lay in the fact that the latter could resort to actual war, when asserting claims or defending infringed interests. The endeavours, which were made by the Church, by royal suzerains and by the barons themselves to restrict and suppress private warfare, are in themselves characteristic of what we should call the anarchy of the times. [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Korlatozott hadviseles

Churches and churchyards were naturally considered as hallowed and therefore neutral territory. In the South, olive-trees were declared to be exempt from destruction by reason of their vital importance in the economy of the country. [...] even St Louis did not insist on a complete abandonment of the practice of private war by his vassals: he only enforced from all those, who resorted to the last argument of war, submission to certain rules as to its declaration, the beginning of hostilities, their course and so on; the quarantaine le Roi was a code as to usage in private war. [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Szemelyes szolgaltatasok

Lásd itt.

Szemelyes egyenloseg

Lásd itt.

Alkotmanyossag

Középkori alkotmányossággal kapcsolatban leginkább annak eredetéről, ill. az elkotmányosság feltételeinek kialakulásáról beszélhetünk, lásd itt, itt és itt:

The lord was a monarch in the manor, but a monarch fettered by a customary constitution and by contractual rights. He was often strong enough to break through these customs and agreements, to act in an arbitrary way, to indulge in cruelty and violence. But in the great majority of cases feelings and caprice gave way to reasonable considerations. A reasonable lord could not afford to disregard the standards of fairness and justice which were set up by immemorial custom, and a knowledge of the actual conditions of life. [...] It was in the interest of the lord himself to strengthen the customary order which prevented grasping stewards and serjeants from ruining the peasantry by extortions and arbitrary rule. This led to the great enrolments of custom as to holdings and services, of which many have come down to us from the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; they were a safeguard for the interests both of the tenants and of the lord. [...] through the strong constitution, rooted in custom, of its manor England, in its social development, got quite as much start of its neighbours, as it obtained precedence over them politically through the early growth of parliamentary institutions. [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Szerzodes

The celebrated enactments of Magna Charta as to personal security and rights of property applied primarily to free men and to free tenements, and of such there were a good many in the manor. Indeed a manor was deemed incomplete without them. Besides the knights and squires or serjeants who held of the lord by military service, there were numerous tenants who stood to him in a relation of definite agreement, paying certain fixed rents or performing certain specified services which, however burdensome, did not amount to the general obligation of rural labour incumbent on the villeins. Many were the tenants, who, without appealing to a charter or a specified agreement to prove their contractual relation to the lord, held their tenements from father to son as if there were a specific agreement between them and the lord, performing certain services and paying certain rents; and this class was the most important of all. These were the freeholders properly so termed or, as they were called in many ancient manors, the sokemen. Without going into the question of their origin and history, we must emphatically lay down the principle of their tenure in feudal society: it was tenure by contract and therefore free. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

Szabadsag

Természetesen itt is inkább relatív (az ókorhoz képest értelmezett) szabadságról, a modern szabadság-értelmezés feltételeinek kialakulásáról beszélhetünk:

Let us remember that the slave of Roman and Saxon times was a thing, an animal at best, that he was supposed to act merely on behalf of his master, that if he committed a theft or slew somebody his master was held responsible for his crime, and that he was not admitted as a warrior to the host and did not pay any taxes to grasping fiscal authorities, though he was estimated at his worth and more than his worth when his master had to pay. All these traits of slavery gradually disappeared when slaves and ceorls were blended in the mould of villeinage. The villein was recognised as having a soul and a will of his own not only in the eyes of the Christian Church but in those of the feudal State. He could enter into agreements, and acquire property in spite of the fact that some authoritative lawyers maintained that he could acquire nothing for himself and that all he had belonged to his lord. He was set in the stocks or hanged for crimes, and the lord had to be content with the loss of his man, as he had not to pay for his felonies. Villeins were grouped in frithborgs or tithings of frankpledge in order that the peace of the realm and its police might be better enforced. They were not merely taxed by their lords and through their lords, but also had to pay hidage and geld from their own land and fifteenths and twentieths from their own chattels. Altogether the government looked upon them as its direct subjects and did not fail to impose duties on them, though it declined to protect their customary rights against the lord. [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Termeszetes monopoliumok felteteles rendszere

[...] I shall merely call attention to the convenience of remunerating an armed servant by the grant of a tenement instead of keeping him as a member of the household or paying him wages. [Vinogradoff, 1913]
Tenure conditioned by service was called the feudum, fief, Lehn [...] [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Tulajdon funkcionalis felosztasa

Besides the political colouring of this contract, it assumes a peculiar aspect from the point of view of land law. It gives rise to a significant distinction of two elements in the notion of ownership (dominium). Roman property (dominium) was characterised during the best period by uncompromising unity. A person having dominium over a thing, including an estate in land, had it alone and excluded everyone else. Medieval lawyers, on the other hand, came to deal with plots of land which had normally two owners, a superior and an inferior, one having the direct ownership (dominium directum, dominium eminens), the other having the useful ownership, the right to exploit the land (dominium utile). [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Kozosseg

The manor afforded the most convenient, and even the necessary, arrangements of work and profit in those times. It would be quite wrong to assume that the interests and rights of the many were simply sacrificed to the interests and rights of a few rulers, that the manor was nothing but an estate, cultivated and exploited for the sake of the lord and managed at discretion by his will and the will of his servants. On the contrary, one of the best established facts in the economic life of the manor was its double mechanism, if one may say so. It consisted, as a rule, of a village community with wide though peculiar self-government and of a manorial administration superimposed on it, influencing and modifying the life of the community but not creating it. This double aim and double mechanism of the manor must be noticed at the outset as a very characteristic feature; it places the manor in a sharp contrast both to the plantations of slaves of the ancient world and to the commercial husbandry of a modern estate struggling for profit as best it may. Manorial husbandry was all along striving towards two intimately connected aims, providing the villagers with means of existence and providing the lord with profits. Hence a dual machinery to attain these aims, both a village community and the lord's demesne. [...] The peculiar bent of the English rural community would perhaps be best indicated by the expression "shareholding arrangement" or "community of shareholders." [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Atfedo jurisdikciok

Egy-egy adott területen több jurisdikció volt érvényben.

One of the most important consequences of the disruption of sovereignty lay in the alienation of rights of jurisdiction by the central government. As early as the ninth and tenth centuries we observe everywhere the growth of franchises and immunities which break up the ordinary sub-divisions of countries in respect of the administration of justice. [...] The central authorities merely strove to retain their hold on the most important varieties of jurisdiction, especially judgments as to great crimes, the Ungerichte, as they were termed in Germany, for which a man may lose his head and his hand (Haupt und Hand), while jurisdiction in minor cases, when a person would only be chastised in skin or hair (in Haut oder Haar), were left to local potentates. [...] This led eventually to a classification of feudal tribunals according to the amount of jurisdiction acquired by them, some claiming high and some low justice (haute or basse justice). [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Versenyzo autoritasok es lojalitasok

Egy-egy adott személyre több lojalitás volt érvényben.

The pre-Westphalian world was characterized as a ‘system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty. (Bull, 1977 254.) Not only were the Church and Holy Roman Empire based on different notions of legitimacy, but individual rulers were enmeshed in complex webs of often contradictory obligations.” [Deets, 19]
Apart from the incitement towards the creation of tenements which came from the wish to recompense officials and soldiers, there were powerful incitements to the formation of tenancies on lands held by the Church. The teaching of the Church as to good works and salvation was eagerly taken up by the laity, who tried to make amends for all shortcoming and sins by showering gifts on ecclesiastical institutions. It is computed that about one-third of the soil of Gaul belonged to the Church in the Carlovingian epoch. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

Lokalitas

[...] Western European society relapsed into political life on a small scale, into aristocratically constituted local circles. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

Teruleten-kivuliseg

But the most extensive application of this private view of jurisdiction is to be found in the growth of franchises (Immunitas, Freiung, Freibezirk). One of the roots of this system is the condition of Royal domains. Their inhabitants are naturally exempted from ordinary jurisdiction and from common fiscal exactions. They are free from toll and geld or general taxes; in matters of jurisdiction and administration they look primarily to the Royal stewards and not to the ordinary judges and officials of the counties. When a portion of the Royal domain is granted to a subject, its condition is not changed thereby -- it keeps its privileges and stands out as a district separate from the surrounding territory. In England especially the condition of "ancient demesne" begins to form itself already before the Norman Conquest. By the side of this institutional root we notice another. As in the later Empire, the government is obliged to have recourse to great landlords in order to carry out its functions of police, justice, military and fiscal authority. Great estates become extra-territorial already under Roman rule in the fourth and fifth centuries, and it would be superfluous to point out how much more the governments of the barbarians stood in need of the help of great landowners. As early as the sixth century we find exemptions ab introitu judicum, that is the privilege of landowners to exclude public judges and their subordinate officials from their estates. Civil and afterwards criminal jurisdiction fell necessarily into their hands as a consequence of the grant of fines and judicial costs. In the beginning the concession of profitable rights or perquisites of justice may have been especially valued, but the duties of jurisdiction could not be separated from the former: it was out of the question to make one set of people perform the work of judicial administration while another set reaped its profits. From such beginning the franchises or immunities develop rapidly into a regular and recognised side of landlordship, and with variations in detail the Anglo-Saxon landrica follows the same track as the continental Immunitatsherr. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

Heteronomia

Vö.: Buzan-Little, 2000: 244-5 és McCracken 2009.

The public organisation of England, for example, was derived from the fact that all the land in the country was held by a certain number of tenants-in-chief, including ecclesiastical incorporations and boroughs, from the king, while all the rest of the population consisted either of under-tenants or of persons settled on the land of some tenant and amenable to jurisdiction through the latter. In other West-European countries the distribution of the people was more intricate and confused because there had been no wholesale conquest capable of reducing conditions to uniformity [...] [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Heteronomia: nem anarchia

Nem anarchia abban az értelemben, ahogyan a partíció eredendően az (bár a partíció nem feltétlenül jelent anarchiát vö. Donnelly 2006).

Heteronomia: nem hierarchia

Nem is hierachia: általában nincs domináns egység és rend.

Heteronomia: szuverenitas felbomlasa

As political subjection was regarded as a matter of contract, the feudal nexus tended towards a disruption of sovereignty, and often led in practice to the formation of numerous political bodies within the boundaries of historical States. This was especially the case in France, Germany and Italy. [...] In Germany the dismemberment of sovereignty was finally recognised by express law in Charles IV's Golden Bull of 1356 in favour of the seven Electors [...] When Frederick Barbarossa went down on his knees, according to tradition, when imploring Henry the Lion of Saxony and Bavaria to stand by him against the rebel Italians, it would have been difficult to say that the Emperor was the sovereign and the duke a mere subject. [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Univerzalis rend

Gurevics, (1974)

Anarchia

It is evident in theory that a baron, being a sovereign, could not be subjected to any will but his own, and that therefore such common arrangements as had to be made in medieval society had to be effected on the same lines as modern international conventions. And indeed we find this idea at the root of the feudal doctrine of legislation; in the custom of Touraine-Anjou it was expressed in the following way: "The baron has all manner of justice in his territory, and the king cannot proclaim his command in the land of the baron without the latter's consent; nor can the baron proclaim his command in the land of his tenant without the consent of the tenant". [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Szemelyes szuverenitas

Theoretically, the individual consent of each member of the gathering to any decision was needed if it were to bind him, but historically, the legislative assemblies were not merely the outcome of feudal meetings, they were also survivals of more ancient popular assemblies, while, as a matter of practice, the authority of the superior lord and the influence of leading magnates asserted themselves in a much greater degree than would have been allowed from a purely individual point of view. It thus depended very much on circumstances whether centripetal or centrifugal tendencies got the upper hand. The majority principle had not been evolved either, at least during the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries. As the French historian Luchaire has expressed it, voices were rather weighed than counted. [Vinogradoff, 1924]
[...] no baron was bound by ordinances in the "establishment" of which he had not taken a part. [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Szemelykozi rend

To Germany some order was brought by powerful leagues between princes and knights on the one hand, cities on the other. Such leagues were offensive and defensive alliances, and ultimately had recourse to force of arms in order to maintain their position. [Vinogradoff, 1924]

A fogalmi elemek kombinacioi a kozepkorban

Ado es termeszetes monopolium

Az adószedés összeomlása után a kormányzáshoz szükséges bevételeket természetes monopóliumok (földbirtokok) kiosztásával biztosították.

[...] the question as to the ordinary means of meeting the requirements of administration has still to be answered. And the answer is clear. The regular administration of medieval States was kept up from the proceeds of crown domains. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

Ado es szemelyes szolgaltatas

Az adószedést személyes szolgáltatásokkal helyettesítik.

As taxation was undeveloped and had to be represented largely by dues from estates, the demands of the government as expressed in personal services of the subject were very great. The machinery of public institutions was based largely on what has been called trinoda necessitas -- attendance at the host, repair of bridges and roads, construction of fortresses, and also on the attendance of suitors at the different public courts, more especially at the county and the hundred. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

Ado es szemelyes hierarchia

As homage creates a relation between man and man, it is not intrinsically bound up with landholding, and a good many of the personal followers and servants of medieval magnates must certainly have lived in the castles of their lords, receiving equipment and arms from them: they saw in the good cheer of the court and in occasional gifts a reward for their personal attendance. [...] But such personal relations tended naturally to strike root in land. If the retainer was at all useful and efficient he expected to be remunerated by a permanent source of income, and such an outfit could only take the shape of a grant of land. On the other hand, when a small landowner sought protection from a magnate, he had generally to throw his tenement into the balance and reassume it as a fief. Thus homage and investiture, although historically and institutionally distinct, grow, as it were, together, and form the normal foundation of feudal contract. [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Szemelyes hadviseles es szemelyes hierarchia

Anyhow it was soon found that owners of single Hufen were not of much use to the army while the army service was a crushing burden for them, and we see in all the principal countries of Western Europe attempts to graduate the standards of equipment of the members of the host by combining the poorer men into larger units. The principle of graduated general service is well expressed in Lombard legislation. The second and third claws of Aistulf's laws subdivide the host into three classes according to equipment. The poorest freemen, characteristically called arimanni or exercitales -- army-men, are bound to attend the host with shield, bow and grows; the owners of forty juga (jugera are meant) of land have to appear with spear, shield and horse; the wealthiest whose estates are computed at seven tributary holdings have to attend in a coat of mail, and if they own more landed property have to muster additional soldiers in proper equipment in proportion to their wealth; merchants should have their duties apportioned on a similar scale. A clause of the laws of Liutprand (83) provides that judges and administrative officials should have leave to exempt a certain number of the poorer freemen from personal attendance, on condition that they should help to carry loads for the army with their horses and perform week-work for the officials during their absence in the host. [Vinogradoff, 1913]
Even in this mitigated form compulsory service in the host and at the courts proved too heavy a burden for the poorer freemen, who, instead of attending to their own affairs, were driven to serve on protracted expeditions. This meant sheer ruin for the smaller households, and the wish to escape from the harassing demands of the military and administrative machinery led many of these smaller people to surrender their dangerous independence and to place themselves under the protection of lay or clerical magnates. This is one of the roots of the commendation in consequence of which the plots of the lower free class shrink apace in favour of the neighbouring great estates. Nor was it the only root. The disruption of the ties of kinship and the insufficiency of ordinary legal protection in those times of violent social struggles and of weak government made it necessary for kinless or broken men to look out for the support of mightier neighbours. And again, all those who had been weakened in the everyday struggle for existence -- widows, orphans, men stricken by disease or economic mishaps -- could not do better than commend themselves to the strong hand of a magnate, although such commendation involved a lessening of private independence and sometimes the loss of land ownership. The various forms of tenant right cropping up in so profuse a manner afforded convenient stages for the gradual descent of the poorer freemen into a condition of clientship, of personal dependence on the "senior." In this way the most characteristic phenomenon of medieval Society, the great estate or the manor, as they said in England, was being gradually evolved. [Vinogradoff, 1913]
The general results of the social processes described may be summed up under three heads: (1) a debasement and breaking up of the class of common free men, (2) the rise of a landed aristocracy, (3) the formation of a large and varied mass of half-free people. [...] Even friling and liber occasionally assumed a shade of meaning pointing to the imperfect status of freed men or of persons living under Roman law and not entirely exempt from private authority. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

Szemelyes hadviseles es szemelyes hierarchia es ado es termeszetes monopolium

A kialakuló személyes hadviselés később, a territoriális kormányzás alakulása során

When tribes settled down and territorial governments were put into shape, the following became an instrumentum regni and the King's following, his trustes or gesith, assumed an exceptional importance. [Vinogradoff, 1913]

és az adószedés összeomlása után kezdtek földbirtokot adni a szolgálatért cserébe.

Feudalism came to be initially a system of local defense against the constant dangers and uncertainties of a rather primitive existence in northern Europe after the relative order of the Roman Empire disappeared. It was Charles Martel who first started granting estates for military service in the eighth century. He had a good reason. Europe was being invaded by a large Muslim army which came up from Spain. Martel could not have gathered a strong enough fighting force without giving the fighters something substantial in exchange for their service. That was land or the right to use land for their own purposes. [...] aristocracy of knights gradually came into being. It was a slow evolutionary process, based on the needs of the time. Elaborate ceremonial procedures were slowly developed to make this military force a permanent feature of medieval life. And it became by force of circumstance a method of government as well. By the ninth century it was demonstrated that this was a more superior fighting force than that provided by levied infantry men. When these organized knights succeeded in repelling the more loosely structured Vikings and Hungarians in the ninth century, no further proof of their usefulness was needed. [Rempel]

Szemelyes hierarchia es univerzalis rend

If we turn to consider the relations between the lord and his vassals, we shall naturally find that they differ greatly from the relations established at the present time between the sovereign and his subjects. In the case of the privileged holders of fiefs, however small, the tie which united them with their suzerain being one not of general subordination but of limited obligation, the view that the general will has to prevail over the particular and can impose rules of conduct upon it did not hold good. [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Szemelyes hierarchia es szerzodes

The granting and receiving of fiefs was confirmed by a contract. An oath of homage and fealty sealed it. It was one of the most important feudal ceremonies. [Rempel]
The essential relations of feudalism are as unfamiliar to us as the conception of the city-state. In one sense it may be defined as an arrangement of society on the basis of contract. Contracts play an important part in the business life of our time, but we do not think of the commonwealth as based on leases; we do not consider a nation primarily as a number of lords and tenants; we do not take the status of every single person to be determined by obligations as to land; we do not assume that the notions of sovereignty and of citizenship depend on the stipulations of an express or implied contract. In the medieval period under consideration, on the other hand, it would be easy to deduce all forms of political organisation and of social intercourse from feudal contract. The status of a person depended in every way on his position on the land, and on the other hand, land-tenure determined political rights and duties. [Vinogradoff, 1924]
The acts constituting the feudal contract were called homagium and investitures. The tenant had to appear in person before the lord surrounded by his court, to kneel before him and to put his folded bands into the hand of the lord, saying: "I swear to be faithful and attached to you as a man should be to his lord." He added sometimes: "I will do so as long as I am your man and as I hold your land" (Saxon Lehnrecht, ch. 3). To this act of homage corresponded the "investiture" by the lord, who delivered to his vassal a flag, a staff, a charter or some other symbol of the property conceded. [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Szemelyes hierarchia es szerzodes: kilepes opcioja

If the tenant thought that he was not treated properly, feudal theory allowed him to sever the connexion. He might leave the estate (deguerpissement) without any further claim on the part of the lord, but according to French notions he might even do more, namely disavow the subjection to the lord while retaining the estate (desaveu). [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Szemelyes hierarchia es szerzodes: kilepeskor bizonyitas terhe a kilepon

This implied a proof on his part that the lord had not fulfilled his part of the agreement. [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Szemelyes hierarchia es szerzodes: kilepo az ur ura fele teljesit

The Assizes of Jerusalem are careful to state the cases of denial of right, in which a vassal may rightfully renounce his obligations in regard to his immediate lord with the natural consequence that henceforth such duties are transferred to the overlord of the one at fault (Assises de Jerusalem, "gager le fief"). [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Szemelyes hierarchia es szerzodes: alkotmanyossag eredete

As as a matter of fact such a desaveu led more often to war than to a judicial process, it was derived from a juridical conception, and expressed the view that the man, vassal or tenant, had definite rights as against his lord. Some of the famous assertions of feudal independence on the part of barons opposed to royal lords are based on this very doctrine of desaveu for breach of agreement. Thus the barons of Aragon swore to their king that they would obey and serve him if he maintained the rights, customs and laws of the kingdom, and if not, not. [...] The clause of the Great Charter stipulating that a committee of twenty-five barons should watch King John's actions, and in case of his breaking his solemn pledges should make war on him and call on all his subjects to do the same, proceeds from the same fundamental assumption. This view was readily extended from the notion of a breach of agreement between the lord and his tenants to a conception of infringement of laws in general. In this way the feudal view could be made a starting-point for the development of a constitutional doctrine. We may notice this in the case of Bracton. In his treatise on the laws of England, written at the time of Simon de Montfort's supremacy, the English judge, instead of urging with the Roman jurists and with his predecessor Glanvill that the sovereign's will has the force of law, states that kings are not above the law, although they have no single human superior (f. 5 v.), and that they ought to be restrained by their peers from breaking the law (f. 34). [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Szemelyes egyenloseg es termeszetes monopolium es alkotmanyossag

[...] the circle of tenants constituting the peers' court was a most complete expression of the principle of equality as between allied sovereigns. The decision was formulated strictly by the peers of the contending parties, and this led, in regard to criminal accusations, to the famous doctrine of the Great Charter: "nullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur nisi per judicium parium suorum vel per legem terrae" (sect. 39). The decision of a court of peers was final. An appeal was impossible from the feudal point of view, because it would have meant a revision of the judgment by higher authority, and feudal litigants submitted not to higher authority but to a convention in which they had taken part. [Vinogradoff, 1924]

Szemelyes egyenloseg es szerzodes

Jelenlegi relevans feltetelek

Allamkozi kooperacio mint globalis rend

Jelenleg a szárazföldek területi partícióján alapuló államok kooperációja a globális rend alapja.

Helyvaltoztatas es kommunikacio szetvalasa

Vö. Buzan-Little, 2000: 278.

Internet mint uj globalis kooperacios ter

A helyvaltoztatas es kommunikacio szetvalasa miatt egy új potenciális globális (határok nélküli) kommunikációs tér alakult ki, amely a múlt század végén 'internet' néven realizálódott.

Ez a kommunikációs tér potenciálisan a globális léptéken túl, szoláris (de nem galaktikus) léptékben is egységes marad (a Marsig kb. negyed óra, a Jupiterig kb. egy óra késleltetéssel), egészen a teleportáció gyakorlati alkalmazásáig.

A téma további kifejtése itt olvasható.

Adozas es internet

A téma kifejtése itt olvasható.

Negyedik generacios hadviseles

A téma kifejtése itt olvasható.

Novekedes es globalis korlatai

A téma kifejtése itt olvasható.

Pillanatnyi feltetelek vizsgalata kozepkori fogalmi elemekkel

[Jelenleg csak néhány elemet használva a vizsgálathoz]

Pillanatnyilag a hatalom nem fragmentálódott.

A közhatalom többnyire nincs magánkezekben.

Az adószedés látszólag a legjobb úton van afelé, hogy az államok globálisan is kontrollálják.

A jurisdikciók nem átfedők, nem heteronómia, és nincsenek versenyző autoritások és lojalitások:

Currently the word ‘neo-medievalism’ is generally used in two ways. Focusing on how states have lost control over their domestic affairs, one details the rise of non-states actors, transnational networks, and international institutions. However, increasing interdependence and reduction in domestic capacities does not necessarily reduce sovereignty in the absence of new organising principles competing with the state. The European Union (EU) may represent an alternative view of neo-medievalism. [...] While the EU is already more than the sum of its states, states are not disappearing. While sovereignty may be diminished, authority structures are not in open competition, as would be the case if authority were truly overlapping. Because of this strong institutionalisation, the EU is far from the chaos and competition implied by neo-medievalism. Furthermore, neither of these models generates real issues of multiple loyalty. [Deets: 19] [Kiemelések tőlem]

Hadviseles pillanatnyi feltetelei

A hadviselés 2001 szeptember 11-e óta nyilvánosan nem állami monopólium.

Hierarchikus kapcsolatok szemelyessegenek pillanatnyi feltetelei

Itt lehet keresnivalónk: elképzelhető, hogy ki tudjuk mutatni, hogy az alkotmányos demokrácia jelenlegi rendszere a pártokkal együtt kedveznek a személyközi hierarchikus kapcsolatoknak, és a bürokratikus kapcsolatok csak ennek leképezései.

Jelenlegi potencialis feltetelek vizsgalata kozepkori fogalmi elemekkel

A középkorban a feudalizmus a hatalmi vákuum és az adózási potenciál meggyengülése miatt alakult ki.

Az államok az internet miatt potenciálisan most is gyenge adóztatók, azonban ez a potenciál egyelőre nem realizálódott a globalis államközi renddel versenyző autoritássá, alternatív lojalitási centrummá, heteronómiává.

Jelenleg csak potenciálisan létezik olyan rend, amely az államközi rendnek alternatívája lenne.

Kooperacio eredendo feltetelei

A kooperáció feltételei itt azért érdekesek, mert a feudalizmus a személyközi hierarchikus kapcsolatok elsődlegessége miatt a személyek kooperációjának a kialakításában és fenntartásában nem támaszkodhat elsődlegesen a térre, mint a kooperációt esetleg megkönnyítő tényezőre.

Ezért kell tisztázni, hogy melyek a kooperáció feltételei az agent-modellektől kezdve a genetikai szintű, az állati és az emberi szintű kooperáción keresztül a személyek kooperációjáig.

Milyen ösztökéket (nudges) használhatunk a kooperáció valószínűségének növelése érdekében?

A téma kifejtése itt olvasható.

Szemelykozi kooperacio mint lehetseges globalis rend

Globalis renddel szembeni kovetelmenyek

Szemelyek konstrukcioja

Szemelyek kozos jog alapjan

Az egyének is és államok is eredendően ide tartoznak.

A téma kifejtése itt olvasható.

Alkotmanyozott szemelyek

Opcionálisan az egyének és az államok is tartozhatnak ide.

A jogi személyek (pl. vállalatok) ide tartoznak.

A téma kifejtése itt olvasható.

Szemelykozi rend vizsgalata kozepkori fogalmi elemekkel

Itt lényegesen több egyezést találunk majd a középkori feudális körülményekkel, mint amikor a pillanatnyi feltételeket elemeztük.

Lehetseges empirikus kerdesek

[Egyelőre sajnos nem tartunk itt.]

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